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Ideology, ideology 
despite everything I still believe there is, 
it is passion, obsession 
of your diversity 
that at the time where it went you do not know 
where we do not know, where we do not know. 
G. Gaber 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The concept of ideology appears elusive, in it are combined philosophical, political, 
sociological, historical, epistemological, pedagogical interpretations. This short essay tries to 
give an interpretation in light of the contribution offered by the reflections of Marx and 
hermeneutical philosophy and, especially in light of the international phenomena in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East and recent economic crises, it overcomes the vision of that 
particular current of late '900 that wanted the era of ideologies as a land no longer fertile and 
destined for sunset. 
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Ideologies have been among the social and cultural phenomena that have most 
influenced the history of the twentieth century and, until the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, many authors have dealt with it. After 1989, however, ideological 
phenomena were dismissed, on the back of the affirmation of the idea of the 
"incredulity towards metanarratives1" present in authors such as Lyotard2. 
As is well known, that of ideology is an elusive concept, in which philosophical, 
political, sociological, historical, epistemological interpretations converge. The 
                                                          
1 "Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This 
incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn 
presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, 
most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in 
the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, 
its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements--
narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on". J. F. Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Translation from the French by Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. 
2 According to the contemporary philosopher, the reasons for the de-legitimization of 
metaraccons or ideologies are primarily internal: "it is first necessary to trace the seeds of" 
decadence "and" delegitimization "and nihilism that were already immanent to the great 
nineteenth-century narratives ». Both the idealistic claim to justify the value of the sciences in 
the context of an encyclopaedic treatment of the life of the Spirit, and the Enlightenment claim 
to establish a link between theory and praxis, denotative statements and prescriptive statements, 
prove to be bankrupt. Marxism, in turn, participates in this double failure. A second reason is of 
external order and resides in the events of history, which have refuted every illusion about the 
magnificent and progressive destiny of humanity, just think of Auschwitz. A third reason, 
always of an external nature, is due to the transformations of post-industrial society, connected 
to the take-off of capitalist technoscience and to the processes of informatization and 
commodification of knowledge: "Our working hypothesis is that knowledge changes the status 
when societies enter the so-called post-industrial age ". When the great stories fail, the problem 
of a new criterion of legitimacy is born. Discarded the criterion of performativity, that is of pure 
performance efficiency, Lyotard is inspired by the "postmodern science", which, as the post-
positivist epistemology has taught us, proceeds in legitimation "for paralyzing" (ie through a 
free or anarchist invention of new "moves" of knowledge), reaching the conclusion that: 
Postmodern knowledge is a type of knowledge that, starting from heteromorph of linguistic 
games, is realized in a short ray plural rationality, aimed at fluid, partial and reversible 
legitimizations : legitimations that presuppose an exclusively local and temporary consent and 
that imply the maximum communication and transmission of knowledge, or the free access of 
citizens "to memories and databases". J.F. Lyotard, The post-modern condition, Milan 1981. 
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term "ideology" appears for the first time with Antoine Destutt de Tracy3 who, 
following the French Revolution, intended to create a veritable branch of study 
to deal with ideas. He tried to determine ideals of thought and action on 
empirically verifiable bases, from which both the criticism of ideas and a 
science of ideas would be born. This initiative was entirely in line with the 
positivist wave that invested nineteenth-century France and which promoted 
confidence in the possibility of studying society through the same tools used for 
the natural sciences. The post-positivist age, however, did not accept the idea 
that the exactness and permanence that these pioneers of the codification of 
knowledge had cherished could be conferred to the extension of human thought 
and imagination. But there is a sediment that must be seriously taken into 
consideration: Destutt de Tracy's intentions reflect the same need shared by 
today's scholars of a professional and scrupulous approach to the study of 
ideology. 
 
 
 
Limits and prays of marxist reflection 
The first who, in an authoritative manner, developed their intuition, Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels, set off in a very different direction. If we look at the 
nineteenth century, in fact, following the triumph of the bourgeoisie and class 
struggles, we witness a radical ideologization of every process of education4, to 
be considered as a time element of social control, but also of political planning 
and the consequent power management. Through the work "German ideology5", 
Marx and Engels rebelled against the prevailing German cultural and 
philosophical tendencies in their time. The spiritual and romantic nature of 
German idealist thought, they argued, was fueled by erroneous conceptions. 
One of these, in an attempt to replace the correct thinking with deceptive 
thought, attributed an independent existence to ideas, thoughts and consciences. 
But in doing so, they said, German philosophers did nothing but fight against 
words instead of confronting the real world. As a result, philosophy clouded 
reality and took the form of what Marx and Engels called "ideology6". They 
                                                          
3 A. L. C Destutt de Tracy. Projet d'Elémens d'idéologie, Paris 1801.  
4 P. Freire, The Politics of Education: Culture, Power, and Liberation, Bergin & Garvey 
Publishers, 1985. Original from, the University of Michigan. 
5 K. Marx, F. Engels, The German ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur, London 1974. 
6 Ibid. 4. 
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argued that "in all ideologies men and their conditions appear turned upside 
down like in a dark room7". Through this analogy they intended to express how 
ideology was an inverted specular image of the material world, further distorted 
by the fact that the latter, under the aegis of capitalism, was in turn subject to 
dehumanized social relations. The role of ideology was to smooth out these 
contradictions by making them appear necessary, normal and congruous. In this 
way it was possible to maintain and strengthen social unity. Ideology was 
characterized as sublimation - in its various forms such as morality, religion and 
metaphysics - of material life. 
His existence was, moreover, studded with people specialized in the mental 
activity of sublimation: priests who offered "salvation8" represented a 
precocious example of such "emancipation9" from the real world. Such diffusion 
could be an act of intentional manipulation, but also - especially for Engels - an 
unconscious or self-deception process. The ideology would therefore have been 
one of the manifestations of the pernicious effects of the division of labor. In 
this particular case, it pushed human thought to abstraction from the real world, 
creating pure theory, morality or philosophy in its place. 
Marx and Engels added to this view on ideology a further dimension that would 
prove to be of particular importance. They combined the concepts of ideology 
and class, underlining how the ideas of the ruling classes were also characterized 
as dominant. The ideological illusions represented an instrument in the hands of 
the rulers, through the State, and were used to exercise control and dominion; 
indeed, to "manufacture history10" in accordance with their interests. Moreover, 
the filtering of interests through a container - ideology - allowed them, and to 
the ideology itself, to be represented as axioms in possession of universal and 
rational validity. This criterion of representation helped those who manipulated 
ideology to elaborate the myth of a unified political community, through 
deceptive laws, cultural orientation, "verbal masking11", that is, power over 
language. The holders of control over conduct and human thought had even 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 10. 
8 Ibid. 17. 
9 Ibid. 23. 
10 K. Marx, F. Engels, The German ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur, London 1974, p. 27. 
11 Ibid. 45. 
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managed to convince the members of the subaltern class - the proletariat - that 
the dominant bourgeois ideology also belonged to them12. 
Thus ideology focused on outward appearances and not on a real understanding 
of the essential. The abnormal became normal thanks to real games of prestige 
and through the fetishization13 of the goods and markets in which they circulated 
(fetishization that gave them a disorienting status of sacredness). 
 Especially in more mature works14, Marx focused on the real capitalist 
procedures from which ideology came, rather than the distorted ideas of 
philosophers and ideologues. Understandably, one of the main missions of what 
later became known as "Marxism" was to unmask and demystify the 
dissimulatory nature of ideology. Critically exposing what the ideology would 
have laid bare, even the false aspirations of its proponents, establishing in their 
place a series of healthy social practices that constituted the empirical basis of 
true social conscience. From the Marxist approach emerges an image of 
ideology as the product of a number of primary causes: the need for accounts of 
the world around us that are simplified and easily traded; the desire of some 
individuals and groups to exercise power and control over others; the growing 
tendency of fragmentation of human activity into separate compartments - the 
division of labor - and of reciprocal distancing between thought and action. 
Ideology reinforces this by keeping societies in a state of suffering and 
ignorance. Marxism recognized considerable power for ideas, which presented 
themselves in the form of ideology. But, according to Marx, such concentrated 
power was wrong, since it constituted an obstacle to the possibility of man's 
emancipation. 
                                                          
12 An exploited worker really believed it was a good idea to wake up in the morning and work 
14 hours in a row in the factory of his employer in exchange for poverty, because he had 
internalized the ideological view that such a dehumanizing work was inevitably part of the order 
industrial, which constituted for its part an act of free will, that the markets offered all the same 
opportunities and that earning a living by renting to others their own workforce was fundamental 
to their sense of dignity.  
13 “The relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a 
social relation of objects which exists outside them.... It is a particular social relation between 
men themselves which in their eyes assumes a phantasmagorical form of a relation between 
things. ... This is what I call fetishism; it attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they 
are produced as commodities, and it is therefore inseparable from the production of 
commodities”. K. Marx, The capital, Intr. M. Dobb, Ed. Einaudi, Torino 1975, vol. I, p. 72. 
14 In particular in the Capital. 
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The assumptions that make these arguments valid are different15: 
 - they depend on the fundamental distinction between true awareness and 
distorted or false beliefs. In order to affirm that our understanding of the political 
world is based on an illusion, we must be certain of the accessibility of non-
illusory wisdom. Marx was convinced that the truth would have arisen once the 
distortions were removed; in other words, that human relationships and sincere 
materials were not only a natural condition obscured by social and ideological 
deformations, but also the scientifically announced result of future social 
development. The fact that the truth could be brought to light (certainly not 
discovered through revelation or intuition, in which Marx did not believe at all) 
in a definitive way, was a non-negotiable assumption; 
- these arguments depend on the ephemeral nature of ideology. If it is a 
distortion, it will disappear as soon as real social relations are introduced. If we 
are dealing with the product of an unnatural and alienating division between 
material and spiritual, it will disappear when we recognize the material roots of 
what is spiritual. And if it consolidates the power relations between the ruling 
class and the dominated class, it will eclipse once these relations are transformed 
into a democratic sense of community and social equality. Therefore ideology 
is superfluous, it is a pathological product of the historical context and will 
vanish when it will improve; 
- the Marxist conception of ideology has contributed to its unified 
understanding. If ideology is really a smokescreen that conceals reality, we will 
first get rid of it and it will be better. In particular, it makes no sense to examine 
it for what it is, nor to draw distinctions between different ideological variants: 
ideology is part of a superstructure devoid of intrinsic value, consequently any 
interest in nature and the mutations of this obscure curtain disappears. Marx's 
simian-messianic conviction, which ultimately would have prevailed in a 
socialist and not deformed society, meant that the defects of the present 
deserved blame, not analysis.  
                                                          
15 “This essay is not an endeavour of Marxological exegesis, but since I consider my self to 
work on the basis of historical materialism, a brief clarification of the relationship of my 
conception of ideology to that of Marx is called for. In Marx we may discern at least two 
different conceptions of ideology or the ideological. One of them is basically the same as that 
adopted here. Ideology is then seen as the medium through which men make their history as 
conscius actors”. G. Therborn, The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology, Verso Classic, 
1999. 
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To assert that political practices or ideas are distorted, one must be sure that they 
have undistorted forms. But even if one were convinced of the present 
omnipresence of such distortions, a political scholar could argue convincingly 
that it is interesting social phenomena and that their analysis is necessary in case 
one wants to understand the nature of politics in society. existing. 
When we dive into the smokescreen, that is, into the substance of ideology, we 
find both affinities and discrepancies: a complex and multifaceted world waiting 
to be discovered. 
In short, the abstract category of Marx "ideology" is populated by a large 
number of concrete ideologies, and the traits they share provide insights of 
immense value in understanding political realities; 
- another  aspect of the unitary character of Marxist ideology is that the different 
ideologies are part of a single, not to say global, description of political reality. 
They represent the essential element that keeps a homogeneous world view 
cohesive, concealing its internal contradictions. This image of coordinated 
totality has prevailed for a long time in the representations of ideology, 
nourishing its inclusive nature and contributing to the obstinacy of some 
ideologues in considering such representations as infallible. One must realize 
that not only are such monolithic visions of the world, but possess a pervasive 
force. In his absence, to maintain the ideology in its place, physical coercion has 
become all too often necessary; 
- the role of ideologues has been overrated. Although Marxist logic emphasizes 
the social origin of ideology, its epicenter has frequently proved to be much 
more circumscribed than an entire social class. The Marxist connection of 
ideology to power relations as well as to the manipulation of the masses has 
often led to the identification of a group of ideology professionals, and even to 
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the identification of the impact of single individuals16.  
The ideologues can be considered intellectuals pervaded by a dangerous sense 
of mission: to be precise, of the mission of changing the world based on a 
specific absolute ideal. 
This perspective involves a rather hierarchical view of the world, as well as 
suggesting that both production and the diffusion of intellectual goods constitute 
a monopoly. 
Marxist class theory provides support for such opinions, although the 
intellectuals who appear in these theories sometimes act independently, less 
defined by their material bases than Marx believes. The connection of ideology 
with these intellectuals has also contributed to the widespread idea that 
ideologies are a priori, abstract and not empirical. This opinion is abundantly 
shared by modern politicians, the press and even by various scholars, especially 
in the English-speaking world, with its myth of empiricism, and in the German 
one, still greatly influenced by the vocabulary used by Marx. 
It remains valid in the emphasis with which Marxism has advocated the 
unmasking of ideologies: 
                                                          
16 “Moreover, if the capitalist economy has its own built-in devices of deception - if, as Theodor 
Adorno somewhere remarks, 'the commodity is its own ideology' - what need is there for 
specifically ideological institutions at the level of the 'super- structure'? Perhaps just to reinforce 
effects already endemic in the economy, but the answer is surely a little lame. Marx may well 
have discovered one potent source of false consciousness in bourgeois society; but whether this 
can be generalized to account for ideology as a whole is surely questionable. In what sense, for 
example, is this view of ideology tied up with class  
struggle? The theory of commodity fetishism forges a dramatically immediate link between 
capitalist productive activity and human conscious-ness, between the economic and the 
experiential; but it does so, one might claim, only by short-circuiting the level of the specifically 
political. Are all social classes indifferently in the grip of commodity fetishism? Do workers, 
peasants and capitalists all share the same ideological universe, universally imprinted as they 
are by the material structures of capitalism? Marx's case in the 'Fetishism of Commodities' 
chapter would seem to retain two dubious features from his earlier version of ideology: its 
empiricism, and its negativism. Capital appears to argue that our perception (or misperception) 
of reality is somehow already immanent in reality itself; and this belief, that the real already 
contains the knowledge or mis- knowledge of itself, is arguably an empiricist doctrine. What it 
suppresses is precisely the business of what human agents make, variably and conflictively, of 
these material mechanisms - of how they discursively construct and interpret them in accordance 
with particular interests and beliefs”. T. Eagleton, Ideology: An introduction, Verso, University 
of Michigan 1991. 
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 - the importance assumed by the social and historical context in the genesis of 
political ideas. By now we consider a truism the concept that people are 
basically the product of the environment they come from, although there are still 
considerable debates about the relative weight of environmental, genetic and 
individual attitudes of choice. Lightened by the Marxist baggage, ideas and 
ideologies are considered the product of groups. They are also part of the 
cultural milieu that shapes our activities and is in turn modeled; 
- the value of ideas. Marx may also have seen in the domain exercised by 
ideology in his epoch a delusional illusion, but even such a framework implies 
that ideas are not pure rhetoric: if ideas present themselves not only as truth, but 
in such authoritarian garments as those of an ideology, they must be considered 
with the utmost seriousness and must be given an even more central role than 
Marx himself; 
 - ideologies are endowed with crucial political functions: they give order to the 
social world, direct it to certain activities, legitimize or delegitimize its 
practices. Ideologies exercise power, if only through the creation of a structure 
within which decisions can be made and give them meaning. This power must 
not necessarily be based on exploitation and dehumanization, but at this point 
only a few anarchists would come to the point of claiming that it can be done 
without power, even limited to its function as an authoritative phenomenon; 
 - the Marxist method has handed down an idea that is of considerable 
importance also for non-Marxists: it is simply a matter of the fact that reality is 
not always the one suggested by appearances. If we want to understand 
ideologies, we must accept the fact that they contain levels of meaning hidden 
from those who use them and, often, even those who create them. The study of 
ideology, therefore, largely includes - though certainly not entirely - the 
enterprise of decoding and identification of structures, contexts and motives not 
easily perceived, and above all the clarification of the morphology of ideologies, 
or how they are formed , what exactly are they, how they work, what they are 
composed of. 
The first key point, in this regard, is the principle that ideologies are forms of 
political thought, which allow a privileged access to the understanding of the 
nature of political theory, showing its variety and subtlety; the thought 
encapsulated in ideologies deserves an examination as such and not only for 
what it hides: it must not be considered a weakened and inferior version of 
analytical or normative philosophical theories. Therefore, some groundless 
presuppositions are removed, which on the one hand believe that ideologies are 
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mutually exclusive systems of ideas and, on the other, that there is a two-way 
relationship between an ideology and a specific political movement. Rather, it 
becomes especially important to distinguish ideology from what is considered 
its authoritative counterpart, political philosophy. 
There seems to be a watershed between philosophy as a reflective activity and 
ideology understood as a combination of genuinely conscious beliefs, 
unconscious assumptions and dissembling rhetorical assertions. But, in reality, 
the choice is not between the mask and the face, because both tell 
complementary stories: we can’t do without one or the other. Ideologies, as real 
practices of a political thought, mix and balance various concepts. What matters 
is not to ask oneself if there is a combination, but rather, what is the range of the 
different possible conceptual combinations that ideologies produce? Continuing 
to consider mutually exclusive political philosophy and ideology, the only result 
will be an artificial and imperfect order, which will devalue some ideologies by 
denying their philosophical attributes and impoverish some political 
philosophies by disavowing their ideological characteristics. 
In the light of these analytical preliminaries, we can deduce that the concept of 
ideology can be understood and studied "considering concrete ideologies as 
emerging from peculiar configurations of political concepts17". 
 
 
 
The hermeneutical approach 
Precisely by exploring the morphology of political concepts, against the 
background of Wittgenstein's references, Merleau-Ponty, the psychology of  
                                                          
17 M. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1996, trad. it. Ideologie e teoria politica, Il Mulino, Bologna 2000, pag. 64. 
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talt, until the postmodernism of Lyotard and Derrida18, it is possible to arrive at 
a precise separation between the point of view of the ideologist and that of 
ideology analyst. Proceeding through an approach that is influenced by Saussure 
linguistics, one comes to consider the constitutive elements of political thought 
as political concepts, expressed through terms such as freedom, justice, power, 
rights. Ideologies are complex constructions, through which particular 
meanings, derived from a universe of meanings, are applied to the wide range 
of political concepts to which they inevitably recur. But while the sentence 
structure is governed by strict grammatical rules, the morphology of political 
concepts is capable of a great deal of variation because there are an infinite 
number of ways in which meaningful components can bind to one another. 
In this regard, it is appropriate that the morphological arrangements of cultural 
and socio-moral concepts are considered both on the basis of their origins and 
on their consequences as sources of meaning. This implies raising the question 
of the role of history in the analysis of ideology and, in parallel, of the role of 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Jacques Derrida and his progeny are primarily interested in the sliding of the Mallarmean 
signifier, rather than in what gets said during the tea-break in the Hilton kitchens. In the case of 
Tel Quel, a starry-eyed Western view of the Maoist 'cultural revolution' is naively transplanted 
to the arena of language, so that political revolution becomes implicitly equated with some 
ceaseless disruption and overturning. The case betrays an anarchistic suspicion of 
institutionality as such, and ignores the extent to which a certain provisional stability of identity 
is essential not only for psychical well-being but for revolutionary political agency. It contains 
no adequate theory of such agency, since the subject would now seem no more than the 
decentred effect of the semiotic process; and its valuable attention to the split, precarious, 
pluralistic nature of all identity slides at its worst into an irresponsible hymning of the virtues 
of schizophrenia. Political revolution becomes, in effect, equivalent to carnivalesque delirium; 
and if this usefully reinstates those pleasurable, Utopian, mind-shattering aspects of the process 
which a puritanical Marxism has too frequently suppressed, it leaves those comrades drearily 
enamoured of 'closure' to do the committee work, photocopy the leaflets and organize the food 
supplies. What is enduringly valuable about the case is its attempt to uncover the linguistic and 
psycho- analytic mechanisms of ideological representation - to expose ideology less as some 
static 'set of ideas' than as a set of complex effects internal to discourse. Ideology is one crucial 
way in which the human subject strives to 'suture' contradictions which rive it in its very being, 
constitute it to its core. As with Althusser, it is what produces us as social subjects in the first 
place, not simply a conceptual straightjacket into which we are subsequently bound. T. Eagleton, 
Ideology: An introduction, Verso, University of Michigan 1991. 
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hermeneutics, which can be traced using the classic searches of Ricoeur and 
Gadamer. 
Between the two positions there are differences regarding the relative ability of 
the interpreter to free himself from the constraints of history. Ricoeur hopes in 
an emancipation from the text oriented to the future, while Gadamer is turned 
backwards and has a cumulative perspective. The analysis of ideologies should 
deviate slightly from both points of view: it is necessary to take into account 
both the context and subjectivism. Change, therefore, is not only incorporated 
into the different historical perspectives that hermeneutics applies to an event of 
the past, but in the multiple meanings introduced by a large number of 
contemporary ideological producers when they structure what they believe, or 
pretend it is, the same ideology. 
Within this school, however, the divergent emphasis on some aspects implies 
different consequences for ideological analysis. Ricoeur, in particular, was 
instrumental in associating hermeneutical interpretation with the study of 
ideologies. Assuming that the polysemy of words is the essential problem facing 
the understanding of ideas, it highlights the selective role of contexts in 
determining the current value that words take in a given message. For Ricoeur, 
the challenge of hermeneutics is to recognize the relatively unequivocal 
message that the speaker has generated from the polysemic basis of the 
vocabulary used. The question of the problem, however, is not conducted on the 
micro level of morphological control, but descending on a unit identified as 
"text", Ricoeur deviates the exploration of ideologies in a circumscribed 
context. The text is approached as a block of meaning, to be absorbed in its 
entirety, as a block capable of independent existence. The hermeneutical 
challenge consists in overcoming the difference between text and 
comprehension which is the consequence of the triple removal: of the author, of 
the socio-cultural decontextualization and of the original addressee. Since a text 
is subject, as Ricoeur sees it, to "an unlimited series of readings", the text is 
emancipated from its initial environment and re-contextualized through 
multiple readings. 
The conclusion, it should be noted, is strongly delimited by the hermeneutical 
enterprise, since Ricoeur (based on Dilthey and Schleiermacher) considers this 
turning point in understanding not as the possibility of discovering an intention 
hidden behind the text, but of unfolding a world before it. -to use the potential 
embedded in the text to re-establish itself through these externally induced 
 19 
 
imaginative variations, and to develop the path of thought open from the text. 
Ricoeur rejects Dilthey's goal of understanding the author "better than he 
understands himself". If ideological analysis were to proceed simply by 
replacing self-knowledge with the external decoding of the references that are 
presumed to be unknown to their authors, this method would be truly 
incomplete. Self-definition must merge with the empirically determinable 
criteria imposed by the analyst. Neither the discovery of the unconscious as a 
primary factor in linguistic expression should in any way worsen the state of 
consciousness. However, some difficulties emerge with Ricoeur's position. The 
text as "an object without life and without author19" does not correspond directly 
to an ideological system for at least the following two reasons: first, ideologies 
are by their very nature oriented towards a particular political and social 
situation, even if not the one in which they saw the light for the first time. 
Consumers of an ideology are not able to see it as a detached text because they 
attribute to it social worlds and secondary authors, however unrealistic or 
inaccurate they may be. Ideologies, unlike texts, are already absorbed as 
partially decontextualized packages. They are transmitted and consumed by 
groups whose perceptions can impose new interpretative rules on those 
ideologies, which in turn must be integrated into hereditary rules of 
interpretation incorporated into existing ideological schemes. Ideologies are not 
in themselves the beginning of the process of interpretation, but are positioned 
at an advanced point in that circular process. No reader is in this sense "free" to 
do what she or he wants because of the cultural bonds that operate on ideological 
interpretation, and because ideologies have groups both as subjects and as 
objects. Secondly, the visualization of the text as an unalterable palimpsest 
detaches it from the mutational foundation which is an important constituent of 
all ideologies. 
It would negate the malleability and fluidity of internal relations that 
characterize each ideological family. While the text as a model of words remains 
an objective constant, all ideologies - because they are constructed by many 
texts - are in a continuous process of reformulation. Although large patterns 
remain identifiable and change imperceptibly for relatively long periods, the 
forcing of an ideology into a text, or a single list of principles, will constitute an 
arbitrary view of its temporal totality. The moment of interpretation, even if 
                                                          
19 P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. J. B. Thompson, Cambridge 1981, p. 
152. 
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found over time, is also a function of time, a product of the temporal 
transmission of meaning. 
Starting from this last aspect, the reflection of Gadamer develops, even if it 
encounters difficulties of an opposite nature. Moving away from epistemology 
and returning to the questions of ontology, Gadamer asks the question: "what is 
the way of being of that being that exists only in understanding?20". Responding 
to this famous phrase, Gadamer refers to the "conversation that we ourselves 
are21". Significantly, Gadamer sets the understanding in a public rather than a 
private context, a structure in which individuals are assimilated by the historical 
process, instead of predicting it. Here is an instrument that apparently can be 
applied to ideological analysis, with its emphasis on public political domain. 
Gadamer's preoccupation with the historical dimension is central to his work. 
Contrary to the discomfort warned by Skinner22 with tradition, understood as a 
reified artificalization superimposed on the historical process, Gadamer sees 
human beings as present within the traditions as part of themselves. The essence 
of understanding involves placing oneself within a tradition. He rejects that 
historical method that requires a liberation from the scholars' prejudices to 
correctly experiment a historical moment, just as it rejects the necessity of 
historical distance as a precondition of understanding. He specifically identifies 
as constraints in thinking those "prejudices and precursors" given within the 
common tradition that binds the interpreter and the object of interpretation. 
While the morphological approach holds that the meaning is largely a function 
of the vast combination of options between the concepts constituting an 
ideology, Gadamer focuses instead on the infinite variations of meaning that 
derive from the different temporal points from which the interpreted text is 
observed. Since we ourselves are constituted by the same traditions in which we 
operate and think, we will share fundamental prejudices with those traditions. 
But distance in time is not something that must be overcome, as Gadamer states, 
                                                          
20 H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, London 1979, p. 54. 
21 Ibid. 340. 
22 Q. Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, History and Theory, 8 
(1969), 3-53. Through the emphasis given to the context and the recovery of meaning, Skinner 
has revitalized the nature of ideological research. However, the heart of his enterprise diverges 
from the field of action that an ideology analyst could more effectively. An essential feature of 
his approach is the fact that he is not overly committed to maintaining the distinction between 
political theory and ideology. "We can hardly argue that we are dealing with the history of 
political theory if we are not willing to write it as a real story, that is, as the recording of a real 
activity, particularly as the history of ideologies." 
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"it is not an abyss that yawns, but is full of the continuity of customs and 
traditions23" that completely reveals the true meaning of the object. At the end 
two horizons appear: one the applicant's horizon and the other that of the 
particular historical situation in which the researcher arises. These two wills 
necessarily merge, although the final product changes continuously, and the 
tension between the two horizons remains a major factor in the process of 
understanding. Moreover, although the possibility of truth in understanding is 
open, "the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never 
finished, it is in fact an infinite process24". However, compared to Skinner, the 
question of tradition is complex. Traditions can be used by ideological actors as 
a metastorical device, while the scholar is committed to discovering empirically 
connected continuities, as well as discontinuities, of a different nature. Concrete 
traditions are often much more fragmented series of highlighted periods and 
unexplored spaces that ideologies cement together. The choice of cement can 
itself become central to the reconstructive hermeneutical enterprise. This 
exercise of choice, however, is fundamental for the analysis of ideologies, while 
at the same time it must strike a note of caution for the scholar who tries to 
emulate the ideological practice rather than maintaining awareness of the 
possible rigidity and artificiality of traditional structures . 
While in the hermeneutic project the text is constant and the interpretations are 
endless, some analysts of ideology reverse this position: the "text" is fluid, 
expressed by many creators within a given family, while the interpretation is 
often connected to a particular temporal manifestation of an ideology and tries 
to provide a lasting understanding, if not completely finished, and to build an 
ideological profile. This temporal arbitrariness is faced with the continuous 
historical flow of an ideology, but there are extenuating circumstances that may 
justify it, and not all of them concern the impossibility of the task or the 
defective perspectives and the skill of the experimenter. Indeed, particular 
historical moments, distinct from the possible ones, may have had a special 
significance in determining the dominant meanings of political concepts that 
comprise an ideology. 
Hermeneutics has three characteristics to offer to the scholar of ideologies. First 
of all, it makes aware the prejudices that govern our understanding, so that a 
more balanced assessment of a text is possible. This avoids the difficulty of 
                                                          
23 H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, London 1979, 263. 
24 Ibid. 264. 
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being trapped in the hypotheses that the text gives us, and is essential for the 
aspect of the "decryption" of the ideological analysis. Gadamer rightly stresses 
that "we can’t avoid thinking about what has been accepted without doubt and 
therefore not thought, by an author, and bringing it into the opening of the 
question25". This brings us beyond intentionality to another level of 
interpretation that must characterize the study of ideologies. The hermeneutical 
position contrary to the Marxist view of ideology reinforces the thesis that the 
ideological unconsciousness in the transmission of messages is not necessarily 
false consciousness. The tension between intentionality and non-intentionality 
must be seen as a permanent feature in a world of multiple meanings, only some 
of which the author can master, and only some of which can be learned by a 
particular interpreter or consumer. Meaning will always work before the 
synchronic study of language, and this indeterminacy is also the key to human 
choice. Secondly, this problem of choice is what Gadamer means by saying that 
"the essence of the demand is the openness and the holding of possibilities26". 
Recognition of the range and plasticity of experience and understanding is 
essential for attempts to acquire knowledge. From this point of view the 
existence of ideologies is not a repressive weight on the human mind, as it is 
often depicted, but a manifestation of the infinite variety of political 
imagination. Thirdly, the temptation of understanding is underlined by the 
awareness of one's own historicity. History is part of the process of 
understanding. Understanding is therefore always interpretation and does not 
have constant reference points. There are variations between the position of 
Gadamer and Ricoeur compared to the relative ability of the interpreter to throw 
the chains of history. Ricoeur hopes for a direct emancipation of the text from 
the future, while Gadamer is backward and cumulative in his perspective. 
Furthermore, Ricoeur sees the consequence of the hermeneutical method as a 
benefit to the interpreter as an actor in the historical process. It speaks of a highly 
personalized hermeneutic experience, which culminates in a 'self-enlargement 
through the appropriation of the proposed worlds that interpretation plays'27. 
This could also be the case, but ideological analysis is also an academic activity 
that sees the critical observer as a provider of reflective and evaluative 
knowledge that is distinct from the knowledge that he or she will produce as a 
producer of ideologies. The hermeneutical enterprise tends to overemphasize 
                                                          
25 H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, London 1979, 264. 
26 Ibid. 265. 
27 Ibid. 94. 
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the analyst's position in the middle of the material studied, at the expense of 
those characteristics of the material that can reasonably be detached from the 
subjectivism of a particular observer. The vision of the ideological analysis 
pursued here differs slightly from both these points of view. The phenomena of 
context and subjectivism must be involved; neither of them should obscure the 
other. We must optimistically think of the possibility of identifying models of 
political thought, as bound by the horizons of our interpretative vision and the 
possibility of approximating the terms of Mannheim28 - to attain relative 
generalizations (if not relative truths), assertions of meaning that are a mixture 
factual knowledge and enlightened, deliberative and cultural understandings. 
Moreover, instead of contending with a fixed text, an unaltered configuration of 
words, we should think in terms of the structural nature of the ideological "text" 
as a system of ideas flexibly linked, open not only to constant reinterpretation 
but, because ideologies are formed through group activity, to the constant 
reaffirmation of their authors in any place and time. In this way we can also 
avoid the accusations of incorporated conservatism to which some varieties of 
hermeneutics have been prey. At the same time, care must be taken not to fall 
into another hermeneutical trap, that is, an exaggerated deconstruction of the 
text, in the sense of looking beyond the text (for example, power structures), 
rather than looking closer the text. 
 
                                                          
28 Mannheim elaborates an analysis of the concept of ideology, focusing on the following 
distinction: that between a particular conception and a total conception of ideology. The 
particular conception of ideology concerns the fact that a subject abandons himself to more or 
less deliberate counterfeits of a real situation, to the exact knowledge of which he would contrast 
his particular interests. These deformations are manifested in every way, in the form of 
conscious or semi-conscious lies, of deception calculated towards others, or of self-delusions. 
The particular conception of ideology indicates a phenomenon that lies between mere lie, on the 
one hand, and the error derived from a deformed conceptual apparatus, on the other. It refers to 
a sphere of psychological errors, which are not intentional in spite of everything, but inevitably 
follow certain causal determinants. It is therefore a conception that confines itself to affirming 
that this or that particular interest is the cause of a certain deceptive attitude. The total conception 
of ideology concerns instead the Weltanschauung of an age or of a historical-social group that 
invests the entire cognitive experience of a subject that belongs to that age or group. It believes 
that there is a correspondence between a certain social situation and a specific perspective, 
opinion or collective consciousness. K. Mannheim, Ideology and utopy, Il Mulino, Bologna 
1957, p. 67-68. 
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Conclusions 
Through this brief analysis it can be said that ideologies are not, as critics of 
ideology argue, a specifically irrational, arid or imperfectly reflective way of 
managing moral choices, normative principles or even truth. This would 
evaluate them on the basis of a standard that simply does not exist in any form 
of political thought. The main characteristic of ideologies is the morphological 
act of decontextation, to privilege among the options, to accept or exclude 
paradigms that interpret political reality, to compete on legitimate meanings 
assigned to political language, not to declare true or false political values, but 
on what conceptual combinations are available to be applied to the 
understanding and formation of the political world. Ideology is one of the most 
basic political phenomena, an activity carried out with concepts and with 
language, which traces the parameters of individual and group behavior. Its 
uniqueness would not be sufficiently appreciated by examining its contents 
simply as catalogs of preference, or by evaluating the quality of its arguments. 
Its most complete meaning is recognized instead by an understanding of the 
methods through which its conceptual configurations are formed. Ideology is 
the product of the organization of information, perceptions, beliefs, pre-
judgments and misunderstandings on the political world, a task made necessary 
by the attributes of language, knowledge and human understanding. These 
concern centrally the indeterminacy, the decision-making process, the 
individual and the social need of the decisions and the malleability of the 
concepts modeled between the two constraints of the logic and of the cultural 
constructs located in space and time. The deepening of these issues is obtained 
by analyzing the internal structures of ideologies, their permutations, the reasons 
for these morphological characteristics and their political consequences. An 
ideological utterance, in addition to a complete ideological system, can’t be 
entirely explained as a reflection of cultural events, spatial and temporal, or as 
a predictable epistemological response to such events. Nor is it to be explained 
entirely as a grammar or internal morphology supported by logical or functional 
connections, independent of its consumers. On the other hand, the interaction 
between these variable factors and their illumination should be sought through 
the optimization of the interpretive perspectives without following every single 
point of view. The hermeneutic conceptions of time, space and horizons; the 
relationships between texts, their producers and their consumers; the role of 
political language in the construction of reality and in providing access to the 
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world out there; unconscious surplus of meaning; essential contestability and 
indeterminacy; the notion of family similarities - all this is useful to the mill that 
analyzes ideologies, discovering the networks of conceptual components that 
make better what they are and suggest what they can be. If we want to 
understand ideologies, we must analyze them as widely supported systems of 
political beliefs, speaking in familiar languages, or accessible to most members 
of a society. Alluding to a mixture of rational and non-rational is to refer to the 
practices of thinking with which societies are aware, in which the 
decontamination undertaken at least in part on the basis of emotional arguments 
or socially inherited beliefs overcomes the challenge. Reason and logic are 
important components of political language, but so are social invocations of 
right and wrong norms, of sense and common sense, of self-evidence, of 
accepted linguistic use. 
So they are the social complaints of all these, but to a lesser extent, since 
challenging them radically is always an uphill struggle. Understanding of 
ideologies therefore requires a different approach to the method, recognizing 
them as attempts to provide their own reasons for a legitimate decontestion, 
through the cultural restriction of meaning - the decision in or out of certain 
ideas, concepts and expressions. A corollary of this is an exploration of the ways 
in which ideologies permeate popular discourse and mass media. 
The elaboration presented recognizes the diversity and possibilities of endemic 
change in ideological morphology. There is no intrinsic justification for 
approving what is, knowing that it is only one of an indeterminate range of 
conceptual options. Rather, the resulting pluralism of ideological expression is 
both an opportunity and an obstacle. He challenges the prevailing limits and 
methods of making sense of ideologies, comments the absence of a touchstone 
to end the rivalry between the contested political ideas that societies face and 
testify to the unfailing fertility of human political imagination. Ideologies can 
be structures of power that manipulate human action, but they are also 
conceptional systems that allow us to choose to become what we want to 
become. 
Ideology can be present in all systems of political beliefs, but it is not identical 
to the "system of political beliefs". If such belief systems are ideological, they 
are not just ideological. Ideology refers to a particular aspect of belief systems 
or - to the extent that a concept gives shape to reality - to a specific way of 
interpreting and decoding political reality, to constructing political practices as 
expressions of political and constitutive ideas, with the ultimate goal of 
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formulating a legitimate public policy. If one argues that a second result of this 
approach is to obscure the distinctions between ideological families, this 
accusation must be rejected. Ideologies can still be grouped into identifiable 
families, however plastic and open to their membership. The point is that, in 
their multiple metamorphoses, the differences between ideological families are 
incessantly accentuated or limited. 
Thus, the scholar of ideologies is called to achieve a balance between three 
elements: the single ideologue endowed with exceptional creativity, the groups 
that supported him and from whom he drew the later creators of ideologies who 
used their multiple interpretations of that individual work to make their product 
more interesting. Therefore, ideologies become the sphere in which political 
theory as a discipline can find its raison d'etre. In conclusion, it can be observed 
that ideologies can certainly be structures of power that manipulate human 
action, but they are also ideal systems that allow us to choose to become what 
we want to become. We do not want, however, to hypothesize that ideology is 
such a general concept that it lacks the capacity for differentiation: ideology can 
be present in all systems of political beliefs, but does not mean "system of 
political beliefs". Rather, ideology refers to a particular aspect of those systems 
or to a specific way of interpreting and decoding political reality. 
Therefore, it appears that this particular current of study that wanted the era of 
ideologies as a land no longer fertile and destined for the sunset appears to have 
been overcome29. The thesis that the end of ideological conflicts, at least 
internally, would have taken place largely due to the accommodating nature of 
the liberal democratic political model seems not so obvious, thanks to the re-
emergence of those tensions, as said both economic and of international politics, 
which may cast doubt on the ideological stability of this political model. 
Moreover, at the international level, in consideration of the war events that have 
inaugurated the new millennium, the influence of the ideological variable seems 
at least to a certain extent, despite the end of the conflict between the Western 
bloc and the Soviet bloc. 
 
  
 
                                                          
29 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York 1992. 
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